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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW—FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE—WHETHER AN
INMATE’S SINCERELY HELD RELIGIOUS BELIEF IS A COMMANDMENT OR
SIMPLY AN EXPRESSION OF BELIEF IS IRRELEVANT TO A COURT’S
DETERMINATION REGARDING THE REASONABLENESS OF ACTIONS
TAKEN BY PRISON OFFICIALS—DeHart v. Horn, 227 F.3d 47 (3d Cir.
2000).
Robert P. DeHart (DeHart) was an inmate serving a life
sentence at the Pennsylvania State Correctional Institute at Greene,
Pennsylvania (SCI-Greene). DeHart v. Horn, 227 F.3d 47, 48 (3d Cir.
2000). While incarcerated, DeHart converted to Buddhism under
the direction of the City of 10,000 Buddhas, a Buddhist educational
center. De Hart claimed that his personal study of the First Precept
of Buddhism, which forbids killing in any form, led him to the
conclusion that he was religiously obligated to follow a vegetarian
diet. As a result, DeHart requested that SCI-Greene provide him
with a vegetarian diet consistent with his beliefs.
While the prison officials at SCI-Greene did not challenge the
sincerity of DeHart’s religious beliefs, they refused to provide such a
meal. The provisions for all inmate meals served at SCI-Greene
were purchased in bulk and the menu was the same for all inmates.
Although the prison served special therapeutic meals to inmates
who required them as a matter of medical necessity, these meals
consisted of smaller portions of the same foods served to the general
population.
DeHart claimed that his request could be
accommodated by simply doubling the amount of vegetables and
grains he was served and adding a soy milk supplement. The
prison officials refused, reasoning that providing DeHart with a
vegetarian meal would create a burden on the administration of the
prison meal system and create jealousy among other inmates.
DeHart filed a written grievance with the prison
administration. Id. at 50. This grievance was denied, and the
Superintendent of SCI-Greene, James Price (Price), affirmed the
prison officials’ decision.
DeHart subsequently appealed this
decision to the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections Central
Office Review Committee, which upheld Price’s decision.
In
response to this denial, DeHart filed a lawsuit against Price and
Martin Horn, Commissioner of the Department of Corrections,

552

RATO SURVEY FORMATTED.DOC

2000]

4/18/2001 10:36 AM

SURVEYS

553

claiming that his free exercise and equal protection rights as
guaranteed by the United States Constitution had been violated.
DeHart first requested a preliminary injunction to compel the
prison officials to provide him with a vegetarian meal until his claim
could be heard on the merits. Id. at 50. After a preliminary
injunction hearing, a magistrate judge recommended that injunctive
relief be denied based upon a finding that vegetarianism was not a
central tenet of Buddhism. Id. The District Court adopted this
recommendation and denied the injunction, whereupon DeHart
appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.
Id. While the court of appeals upheld the denial of injunctive relief
in an unreported memorandum opinion, it warned the district court
not to make judgments regarding the centrality of vegetarianism to
Buddhist belief. Id.
On remand, the parties engaged in additional discovery and
filed cross-motions for summary judgment. Id. The magistrate
judge ultimately recommended that summary judgment be granted
on behalf of the prison officials. Id. DeHart objected to the adoption
of the magistrate’s report because it was again based on the finding
that vegetarianism was not a central aspect of the Buddhist faith. Id.
Despite DeHart’s objections, the district court adopted that
magistrate judge’s recommendation and entered summary
judgment for the prison officials. Id.
On appeal, a panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit reversed the district court’s grant of summary
judgment in an unreported opinion. Id. Subsequently, the en banc
Third Circuit reversed the decision of the district court. Id. The
Court of Appeals held that the District Court erred by failing to
examine whether DeHart retained other means of expressing his
religious beliefs, and by justifying its decision with the finding that
vegetarianism was not a commandment of Buddhism. Id. at 54-56.
Writing for the unanimous en banc panel, Judge Stapleton
commenced the court’s analysis by observing that DeHart did not
relinquish his constitutional rights solely by virtue of his
incarceration. Id. at 50. Nevertheless, the judge stressed the fact that
the myriad interests served by the prison system, such as the
rehabilitation of inmates and security concerns, necessitated the
abridgement of constitutional rights in the penal context. Id. at 5051. As a result, the court noted, prisoners are afforded constitutional
protection only insofar as their rights do not run afoul of “the
legitimate penological objectives of the corrections system.” Id. at 51
(quoting Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974)).
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The court proceeded to explain that the proper standard of
review for prison regulations that burden the constitutional rights of
inmates was set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Turner
v. Safley. Id. (citing Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987)). The Turner
factors, Judge Stapleton noted, attempt to balance the prison
officials’ interest in furthering the objectives of the penal system,
while at the same time protecting an inmate’s constitutional
prerogatives to the extent consistent with the fact of incarceration.
Id.
The court acknowledged that the ultimate indication of
constitutional validity under Turner is a court’s finding that the
particular prison regulation at issue “is reasonably related to
legitimate penological interests.” Id. (quoting Turner, 482 U.S. at
84).
Judge Stapleton maintained that in conducting such an
analysis, the court must give due deference not only to the
prisoner’s constitutional rights, but the necessary regulatory power
of prison officials. Id. Especially important, the judge cautioned,
were the separation of powers concerns raised by inappropriate
judicial analysis of the “increasingly urgent problems of prison
administration” that are appropriately left to authorities of the other
branches of government. Id. (quoting Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S.
396, 405 (1974)).
Next, the court articulated the four “reasonableness” factors
announced by the Supreme Court in Turner. Id. First, the court
noted that the prison regulation at issue must bear a rational
relationship to some legitimate interest served by the penal system.
Id. The court explained that this interest must be sufficiently
furthered by the regulation so as to not be rendered arbitrary. Id.
The second factor, the court stated, was the availability of
alternative methods the inmate retained to exercise the burdened
constitutional right. Id. Third, the court declared that a reviewing
court must evaluate the impact of allowing the exercise of the
constitutional right on the prison community as a whole. Id. The
fourth and final factor, the court explained, was whether alternative
means existed whereby prison officials could accommodate the
inmate’s request with a de minimus impact on the penological goals
of the prison. Id.
The court indicated, however, that two prerequisites must be
satisfied before conducting a Turner analysis. Id. Specifically, the
court explained, an inmate’s beliefs allegedly burdened by a prison
regulation must be (1) genuinely held and (2) religious in nature. Id.
These predicates were necessary, Judge Stapleton opined, in order
to protect prison regulations from constant attacks based not on
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inmates’ constitutionally protected religious beliefs, but on mere
secular preferences. Id. at 52. With respect to DeHart’s claim, the
court stated that these prerequisites were not in issue because the
prison officials stipulated that DeHart’s request for a vegetarian diet
was a result of his genuine subjective interpretation of the First
Precept of Buddhism. Id.
With this threshold matter resolved, the court went on to
address the first Turner factor: the connection between the prison
officials’ refusal to provide DeHart with a vegetarian meal and some
relevant penal interest. Id. The court noted that the prison officials
set forth two justifications for their refusal to accommodate
DeHart’s religiously compelled vegetarianism: the need for a
simplified prison menu plan, and the prevention of jealousy by
other inmates over DeHart’s perceived special treatment. Id.
Evaluating other Third Circuit cases that addressed the validity of
prison officials’ interest in an efficient food system, Judge Stapleton
concluded that the rationales set forth by the prison officials in the
present case were legitimate penological concerns. Id. at 52-53
(discussing Johnson v. Horn, 150 F.3d 276 (3d Cir. 1998)). Specifically,
the court found that the therapeutic meals already prepared by the
prison kitchen complicated the inmate meal process, and obliging
DeHart’s request would have an incremental, albeit minor, impact
on prison efficiency. Id. at 53. Furthermore, the court held that
providing DeHart with a meal in accordance with his religious
scruples could result in jealousy among the other inmates. Id. As a
result, the court concluded, the prison officials’ refusal to
accommodate DeHart’s request was sufficiently related to the
penological interests asserted. Id.
Rather than concluding the analysis into the reasonableness of
the prison officials’ decision, the court explained, this judgment only
served to meet the first requirement of Turner. Id. While the finding
of a sufficient connection between the prison officials’ decision and
legitimate penal objectives was essential, the court explained, the
reasonableness determination proposed by Turner also mandates
that a court inquire into the impact of accommodating the inmate’s
request on the prison system in some other manner, as well as any
alternative regulations that could serve the prison’s interests while
lessening the burden on the inmate’s constitutional rights. Id.
With this caveat, the court moved on to the second Turner
factor, the alternative means by which DeHart could exercise his
Buddhist beliefs despite the prison officials’ refusal to provide him
with a vegetarian meal. Id. Judge Stapleton stated the evaluation of
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the second Turner factor as an alternative inquiry: If the prison
officials could show that DeHart had other means by which to
pursue his free-exercise rights, the court should be especially
deferential to the prison officials’ judgment regarding the
reasonableness of the restriction; alternatively, if DeHart possessed
no other way of exercising his religious beliefs, this factor would
weigh in favor of his claim. Id. at 53. The initial question, the court
noted, was determining the proper definition of “alternative means
of exercising the right” to free exercise of religion. Id. (quoting
Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 417 (1989)). The judge explained
that on several occasions, the Supreme Court has announced that
the right in question must be interpreted expansively. Id. (citations
omitted). Therefore, the court explained, the appropriate definition
of the right asserted by DeHart was his ability to engage in Buddhist
practices generally, not merely his access to a vegetarian meal. Id. at
54.
The court found that DeHart was allowed to engage in several
expressions of his religious belief, such as praying and meditating in
his cell, reciting the Sutras, and corresponding with Buddhist
authorities. Id. Furthermore, the court explained, DeHart was
permitted by the prison officials to obtain items made out of canvas,
instead of those made out of leather, in order to accommodate his
belief that forbade him from using anything that resulted from the
killing of a living thing. Id.
Although the court acknowledged that these facts must be
taken into consideration in determining whether the prison officials’
restriction was reasonable, the court decided to remand
consideration of the second Turner factor to the district court. Id.
The judge observed that when originally evaluating the second
Turner factor, the district court relied on earlier decisions of the
Third Circuit which made a distinction between religious
“commandments” and “positive expressions of belief.” Id. The
Court found this distinction to be inappropriate. Id. The district
court also erred in evaluating the second Turner factor, the court
determined, by finding that DeHart’s request for a vegetarian meal
was unfounded because it was not mandated by the “three major
traditions of Buddhist practice.” Id. at 55. The court reasoned that
while such determinations were supported in part by the Third
Circuit’s decision in Johnson v. Horn, 150 F.3d 276 (3d Cir. 1998),
Johnson was inconsistent with several opinions of the Supreme
Court and the circuit’s own case law. Id. at 56 (citing Johnson, 150
F.3d at 282).
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In Johnson, the court explained, the Third Circuit determined
that the alternative means of expression inquiry mandated by the
second Turner factor was irrelevant in those cases in which the
asserted practice was a “commandment” of the religion, rather than
simply an “expression of belief.” Id. at 55 (quoting Johnson, 150 F.3d
at 282). Judge Stapleton, however, noted that this evaluation was
inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s opinion in O’Lone v. Estate of
Shabazz, 482 U.S 342 (1987). Id. at 56. In O’Lone, the judge noted,
when determining whether a prison’s decision to preclude a group
of Muslim inmates from attending a weekly Jumu’ah worship
service central to Islamic beliefs was reasonable, the Supreme Court
focused on whether the inmates retained the ability to express their
Muslim beliefs in any other way—irrespective of whether there was
any other way to engage in Jumu’ah. Id. at 53 (citing O’Lone, 482
U.S. at 351).
As a result, the court held that the
commandment/positive expression distinction was incompatible
with the Supreme Court’s opinion in O’Lone, and overruled
Johnson’s analysis of the second Turner factor. Id. at 55.

Likewise, the court expressed reservations regarding the
district court’s reasoning that DeHart’s request for a vegetarian meal
was entitled to less constitutional protection because it was not
orthodox compared to the traditional doctrines of Buddhist
teaching. Id. Judge Stapleton noted that it was inconsistent with a
long line of Supreme Court decisions, most notably Employment
Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), for a judge to inquire into the
“centrality” of a particular religious practice. Id. at 56. Although the
Smith decision was badly fractured, the court noted, all of the
concurring and dissenting opinions approved of the plurality’s
assertion that “it is not within the judicial ken to question the
centrality of particular beliefs or practices to a faith, or the validity
of particular litigants’ interpretations of those creeds.” Id. (quoting
Employment Division, 494 U.S. at 886-87 (internal citations omitted)).
While noting that the record evidence indicated that DeHart
retained alternative means of exercising his religious beliefs, the
court nonetheless indicated that it would require the district court to
reevaluate the second Turner factor. Id. at 57.
The court then turned its attention to the district court’s
analysis of the third and fourth factors of the Tuner test. Id. With
respect to the third Turner factor—the impact accommodating
DeHart’s request would have on inmates, guards, and other
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resources—the court disapproved of the district court’s holding. Id.
The district court had held that because there was no
uncontroverted evidence regarding the impact of DeHart’s request
on the prison community, the third factor was neutral. Id. Judge
Stapleton, however, held this conflict had to be resolved with
findings of fact before the district court could even undertake the
weighing analysis of Turner. Id. Particularly troubling, the court
noted, was the fact that DeHart claimed that prison officials were
able to accommodate the dietary requests of Jewish inmates, while
not affording the same accommodation to DeHart. Id. While the
court noted that some reasoned distinction may exist between the
accommodation of Jewish inmates and DeHart’s request for a
vegetarian meal, the fact that one was not asserted in the record
precluded the district court from properly evaluating the third
Turner factor. Id. at 59. Likewise, the court explained that the
district court’s evaluation of the fourth factor—whether de minimis
alternatives existed to accommodate DeHart’s request for a
vegetarian diet—suffered from the same infirmities. Id.
Finally, the court reversed summary judgment on behalf of the
prison officials based upon a finding that the district court
improperly evaluated the overall balancing test required by Turner.
Id. As the court explained, the district court based summary
judgment on the fact that the first two Turner factors weighed in
favor of the prison officials, while the last two factors were neutral.
Id. Putting aside the district court’s errors in evaluating the Turner
factors individually, the court found that the Turner test “does not
call for placing each factor in one of two columns and tallying a
numerical result.” Id. The Turner standard, the court elucidated, is
to assess the overall reasonableness of the prison officials’ denial of
DeHart’s request. Id. In the present case, the court explained, the
prison officials’ asserted interests were efficiency and prevention of
inmate jealousy. Id. The court found, however, that these interests
were undercut by the prison’s existing policy of serving inmates
therapeutic meals separately with no apparent effect on inmate
jealousy, and the fact that DeHart’s requested meal would only
force the prison officials to obtain a relatively inexpensive soy-milk
supplement. Id. In light of these facts, the court reversed summary
judgment and remanded the case to the district court for a more indepth analysis of the Turner factors. Id. at 60.
After concluding the analysis of DeHart’s free exercise claim,
the court turned to consideration of his equal protection claim. Id. at
61. The court explained that DeHart’s equal protection claim relied
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on the fact that he was denied the right to have a vegetarian meal in
accordance with his Buddhist beliefs, while the Jewish inmates in
Johnson were given a kosher meal in accordance with their faith. Id.
Noting that the four Turner factors were applicable to this claim as
well, the court explained that DeHart’s equal protection claim must
fail if the prison officials’ decision to deny him a vegetarian meal
was “reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.” Id.
(quoting Clark v. Groose, 36 F.3d 770, 773 (8th Cir. 1994)). The court,
however, explained that the justification for such a distinction had
not been explained by the prison officials or the district court below.
Id. As a result, the court remanded consideration of this issue to the
district court as well. Id.
In DeHart, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit reconciled its free exercise jurisprudence with the holdings
of the Supreme Court. Although this decision may have the
unintended effect of lessening the free exercise protection afforded
to inmates because those activities which are religious
“commandments” are no longer entitled to heightened protection,
the commandment/expression of belief distinction is not an
appropriate forum for judicial decision making. Given today’s
religiously pluralistic society, the judiciary has reasonably declined
to serve as a moderator of religious orthodoxy, limiting its analysis
to the sincerity of an inmate claiming a free exercise violation.
Although the Turner standard may narrow the constitutional
protections accorded to religious freedoms the, the Third Circuit
wisely refused to dismiss DeHart’s claim based upon a judicial
interpretation of Buddhist ecclesiastical concerns.
Michael Rato

